Standing Committee A

[Mr. Alan Hurst in the Chair]

Planning and Compulsory Purchase (Re-committed) Bill

Keith Hill: I beg to move,
That— 
 (1) during proceedings on the Planning and Compulsory Purchase (Re-committed) Bill, the Standing Committee do meet when the House is sitting: 
 (a) in addition to its first sitting on Tuesday, 14th October 2003 at 10.30 am, on that day 4.30 pm; 
 (b) thereafter, on Tuesdays and Thursdays at 9.10 am and 2.30 pm; 
 (2) the proceedings shall be taken in the following order, namely New Clauses and New Schedules standing in the name of a Minister of the Crown, remaining New Clauses and New Schedules, Clauses 5 to 11, Clause 15, Clauses 19 to 36, Clauses 44 to 53, Clauses 56 to 72, Clauses 79 to 90, Schedules 2 to 6, Clauses 1 to 4, Clauses 12 to 14, Clauses 16 to 18, Clauses 37 to 43, Clauses 54 to 55, Clauses 73 to 78, Schedule 1, and remaining proceedings on the Bill; 
 (3) the proceedings so far as not previously concluded, shall be brought to a conclusion at 5.15 pm on Thursday, 23rd October 2003.
 I welcome you to the Chair, Mr. Hurst. I am sure that I speak for the whole Committee when I say how much I am looking forward to debating matters under the wise chairmanship of Mr. Pike, Mr. Hancock and yourself. 
 We will be discussing important subjects, both today and in future sittings. There is no doubt that the Bill, although many parts of it are technical, deals with important matters of great interest to many people outside this Room. I am pleased to say that those important matters now include Crown immunity, thus implementing a commitment upheld by Members on both sides of the House since 1994. I intend to proceed in the spirit of openness and clarity—and, I hope, with despatch. I am sure, however, that the Committee will understand that some explanation of the new matters before us will be necessary, and that hon. Members will be willing to listen to the Government's case. I am convinced that we are about to embark on a succession of constructive debates. 
 I hope that the first group of amendments show the Government's willingness to consider the amendments tabled by other members of the Committee. The first amendment could well be dubbed the Spelthorne amendment, in honour of a previous and, I understand, somewhat loquacious, member of the Committee. Before the sitting I provided the Committee with a series of documents to aid debate, and several copies of those documents are now available in the Library. I shall provide some of the detail that was unavoidably missing when the Bill was debated before, and I hope that we will be able to make good progress.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I start by welcoming you and Mr. Pike to the Chair, Mr. Hurst.
 I assure you that the Opposition will try to be as constructive as possible within the constraints placed on us. I also thank the Clerks, who, as we will see, have done a huge amount of work in a very short period. I also welcome the new Minister for Housing and Planning. He and I have known each other for a long time, and I am sure that our relations will be cordial, although there will be difficulties, given the constraints placed on the Opposition.
 The Bill places us in uncharted waters. It was originally introduced to the House on 4 December 2002 and the House treated it with—to use the Minister's words—great despatch: it had had its Second Reading and had passed through Committee by the end of January. We then heard nothing, and assumed—indeed, hoped—that the Bill had gone away, until June when the previous Minister, the hon. Member for Harrow, East (Mr. McNulty), who is now the Under-Secretary of State for Transport, announced his intention to re-commit it. He gave me certain undertakings that we would have adequate time to reconsider not only all the parts of the Bill that we considered during its previous consideration, which was heavily timetabled, but also those that we did not consider then. We should bear in mind the fact that of the original Bill, the Committee discussed only 30 of the 90 clauses, and one of the six schedules. A large proportion of the Bill was therefore never discussed in Committee at all—and now we have more than 120 pages of highly complex amendments, most of which are Government amendments. In other words, this Bill is far longer that the original Bill, which took up 74 pages. 
 When the Government lay Bills before their client Parliament—at least, I hope that they regard Parliament as their client—they should try to ensure that their legislation is more correct the first time. Indeed, that is a matter of professional pride. Bills should not be introduced to Parliament until they are in a more correct form. Now we have to deal with all these highly complex amendments in just eight sittings. 
 When the Bill was originally considered last January, we had 12 sittings. In June, when the motion to re-commit it was put before the House, I told Ministers that eight sittings were not enough. The Minister has been very kind, offering us flexibility and the opportunity to sit for more hours, but the problem is that these matters are so highly complex that unless one is superhuman, one cannot concentrate on them for longer than the six or seven hours already allocated, so we need more days. I hope that there will be some flexibility. 
 We are in uncharted waters not only because the Bill has been re-committed—I do not believe that that has happened to any other Bill in Parliament before—but because the resolution of the Programming Sub-Committee puts the Government new clauses and new schedules first. I have never heard of a situation whereby the Government have proposed an amendment, new schedule or new clause and the Committee has dealt with that, and then had to return to the same subject for Opposition amendments. Why are the amendments not grouped as they always used 
 to be, with new schedules and new clauses relating to certain matters in the Bill grouped together? 
 I must register my extreme displeasure with the programme motion. The Opposition will vote against it. However, we will try to deal with matters as well as we can. Very unusually, I have already signed some of the Government amendments, motions, because I agree with them and hope that they can be dealt with formally. There are many amendments on the amendment paper that could be taken formally, and if we could reach an agreement between the Opposition parties, that would allow us more time to debate the contentious issues. Surely that is our purpose. 
 We are going to have difficulties in dealing with such a large amount of stuff. The Minister has put a number of papers in the Library today, and there is a written statement on the Order Paper—but the Committee started at 10.30 on the first day back from the recess, and we are supposed to have taken in that huge wodge of papers before considering the Bill. That is a very unsatisfactory way of doing business. The Government ought to be able to lodge the papers earlier. I accept that this is the first day back, but we should not be in Committee on the first day back if the Government did not table all the papers before the summer recess, as I asked them to. 
 I have registered my strong displeasure, and we will vote against the programme motion, but I hope that we can proceed with the Committee with all due dispatch.

Matthew Green: I too welcome you, Mr. Hurst—and Mr. Pike—to the Chair; I am looking forward to serving under your chairmanship. Unlike the hon. Member for Cotswold (Mr. Clifton-Brown), I will try not to take up much of the limited time that we have available.
 The Liberal Democrats welcome the Bill's return to Committee, because clearly it was not dealt with in its entirety in January. We welcome the Government's use of the intervening nine months or so to come up with some welcome new clauses, particularly on the issue of Crown immunity. I hope that we can move through those with some expedience. 
 I am sure that the new Minister will approach the Bill in a constructive manner. I fully expect him to listen intently to the issues raised, and I hope that we can move on to the new clauses and amendments that have been tabled by both the Opposition parties, because they raise some interesting points. 
 I am concerned that only three of us in this Room—the hon. Members for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman) and for Cotswold and myself—served on the original Committee in January. We are almost halfway through the process, and all the names have changed so we are starting all over again. We welcome the Bill's return to Committee, but we are concerned about whether we will get through everything in eight sittings. We would have preferred a longer time, but we will not seek to force that to a vote, preferring to see whether the Minister will live up to his promises of flexibility, and whether we can move through the issues and achieve most of our objectives. If we do not, we 
 will seek to persuade him that more time should be allowed later.

Sydney Chapman: I join other hon. Members in welcoming you to the Chair, Mr. Hurst, and I look forward to working with you. Although I have announced that I shall not be standing at the next election—[Hon. Members: ''Shame!'']—I hope that this will not be the last time I shall serve under your chairmanship.
 I shall speak briefly because my hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold has said most of what I wanted to say. As the hon. Member for Ludlow (Matthew Green) has rather painfully reminded me, few of us now here were on the original Committee that considered the Bill. In my experience this is a first in the context of re-committing Bills. I believe that the timetable that has been set is grossly inadequate. It is inadequate even to deal with all the Government new clauses, and the original Committee only had time to examine about 26 of the 90 original clauses. 
 Even the most die-hard Government supporter—if there is such a person left—would admit that there was no filibustering or prevaricating by the Opposition. The hon. Member for Ludlow was the only hon. Member carrying his party's banner on that occasion, and it is good to see two Liberal Democrats here today. My point is that the original version of the Bill was not examined adequately. It was, to use the words of the then Minister, the hon. Member for Harrow, East, ''fast-tracked''—as if that gave it some aura of distinction.

Edward Davey: For the record, may I explain that we wanted two Liberal Democrats on the Committee the first time, but Plaid Cymru insisted on taking up an offer of a place, which prevented that—although I believe that the Plaid Cymru member of the Committee never turned up.

Sydney Chapman: My memory does not go back that far, but when I said that there was only one Liberal Democrat I was not implying any criticism. One might say that even one was too many.
 There is little enough time to examine the Government new clauses, and there is certainly not enough time to examine all the amendments. The only way in which we might be able even to mention the sixty-something clauses that were not examined in the Committee at the beginning of the year would be through tabling an amendment. I appeal at this late stage to the Minister—whom I wish well, and welcome to his post—to relent and relax and allow us to study the Bill adequately. 
 It seems strange and unfair to me that the Government new clauses should be given precedence in Committee, although it is quite understandable that that should happen on Report, for practical as well as technical reasons. 
 My final point is about something that emphasises the Government's approach. For several weeks I have had a little battle at business questions, with successive Leaders of the House, about whether, if the Bill were re-committed, there would be an opportunity to examine the clauses that were not examined in 
 Committee originally. First the response was of the ''very much regret'' kind; it moved on to, ''We will look into this,'' and then to ''The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point.'' Finally we were advised that we would be able to consider the clauses that we could not discuss the first time round. Technically that is correct. As I understand it, we can, in the eight sittings of this Committee, raise the clauses that were not considered previously. However, in reality there will be no time—or, if there is, we will be able to do the job only in a technical sense, and not adequately. 
 I am sorry to sound so depressed and pessimistic. I assure hon. Members that I want to be constructive in trying to improve the Bill, but we must have this little bellyache now and put on the record that this is the most unsatisfactory way to examine a Bill. Whatever our political prejudices, it is Back Benchers' duty to ensure, first and foremost, that Bills are properly examined and, if possible, improved.

Keith Hill: I begin by expressing my gratitude for the spirit in which the hon. Member for Ludlow made his observations, and for the kind words of the official Opposition, who have stated where they stand.
 The primary purpose of the reconvened Committee is to consider the new substantive Government amendments, and the programme motion reflects that. We will consider all Government new clauses first, all other new clauses next, followed by the clauses that were not fully debated before and, finally, the clauses that we have already debated. 
 The documents that I released to the Committee, as promised, relate mainly to later aspects of the Bill, so Committee members should have the opportunity to absorb their content before we come to the matters involved. 
 The motion includes no knives and I reiterate my willingness to be as flexible as possible: if we need more time, we shall have it. Members have referred to the original proceedings, but of the 90 clauses in the original Bill I know of only 24 that were debated. That does not necessarily imply that the Committee had inadequate opportunity to deal with the Bill in totality. This Bill may contain 90 clauses, but much of it is procedural, interpretive or technical. Indeed, four clauses relate to the correction of errors. I understand that there was an exchange about that in the earlier proceedings. Some 14 clauses relate to general provisions—in other words, they are regulation-making powers, supplementary or interpretation provisions, or repeals, or they deal with commencement and extent. Some 19 clauses relate to Wales—I do not disparage that principality, which is the land of paradise—but many of them reiterate other parts of the Bill. 
 I tabled all new clauses and amendments in good time for the sitting, and there are about 30 new clauses for debate. The rest of the Government amendments are minor and technical, although extremely voluminous. We can play games with the numbers, but the apparent volume is misleading. The Scottish 
 amendments are exactly the same as the English in principle and application, but are tweaked slightly to reflect Scottish legislation. We do not expect them to detain the Committee unduly. 
 I understand the Opposition's arguments, but I believe that we are all committed to dealing with the Bill in the spirit of openness and clarity and with dispatch. For those reasons, I commend the programme motion to the Committee.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: Before we vote, I raise one other matter with the Minister: the illogicality of the order of consideration. I refer the Committee to the part of the Bill involving plan making, which is the most important as the rest of the Bill will hang on it. Unfortunately, plan making is unnecessarily complex and will hold up the planning system. We are to consider clause 15, going back to clauses 2 to 6 and back again to clauses 1 to 4 and forward to clauses 12 to 14 and clauses 16 to 18. Surely the one good thing about the Bill is that it is set out logically. We should consider it in that logical order as far as possible while bearing in mind what the Minister is determined to do in relation to the Government new clauses and new schedules, which I understand, although I do not agree with it.

Keith Hill: The order of the debate reflects the logic of the order of the Government new clauses. I reiterate that if we can deal with those rapidly, we can move on to what the hon. Gentleman regards as the meat and drink of the measure.
 Question put:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 8, Noes 4.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Alan Hurst: I remind the Committee that there is a money resolution in connection with the Bill, copies of which are available. I also remind Members that adequate notice should be given of amendments. My co-Chairman and I do not intend to call starred amendments, including any that might be reached during and after this sitting.New clause 4 Effect of revision or revocation of development order on incomplete development

New clause 4 - Effect of revision or revocation of

'In the principal Act after section 61C (planning permission granted by local development orders) (inserted by section 39 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2003) there is inserted the following section— 
 ''61D Effect of revision or revocation of development order on incomplete development 
 (1) A development order or local development order may include provision permitting the completion of development if— 
 (a) planning permission is granted by the order in respect of the development, and 
 (b) the planning permission is withdrawn at a time after the development is started but before it is completed. 
 (2) Planning permission granted by a development order is withdrawn— 
 (a) if the order is revoked; 
 (b) if the order is amended so that it ceases to grant planning permission in respect of the development or materially changes any condition or limitation to which the grant of permission is subject; 
 (c) by the issue of a direction under powers conferred by the order. 
 (3) Planning permission granted by a local development order is withdrawn— 
 (a) if the order is revoked under section 61A(6) or 61B(8); 
 (b) if the order is revised in pursuance of paragraph 2 of Schedule 4A so that it ceases to grant planning permission in respect of the development or materially changes any condition or limitation to which the grant of permission is subject; 
 (c) by the issue of a direction under powers conferred by the order. 
 (4) The power under this section to include provision in a development order or a local development order may be exercised differently for different purposes.''.'.—[Keith Hill.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Keith Hill: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 5, 6, 31 and 32.

Keith Hill: I understand that in the earlier proceedings of the Committee, the hon. Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire) tabled an amendment in respect of clause 39 and recommended that developers who had started work permitted by a local development order should be allowed to complete that work, notwithstanding the subsequent revocation of the order. The provision for an LDO allows local planning authorities to expand on the permitted development rights set nationally in the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 1995 by introducing local permitted development rights. For example, a local authority with a policy of reducing the number of offices in a town centre and encouraging more shops might choose to make such convergence the subject of an LDO, meaning that a separate planning application would not be required. The object of the provision for a local planning authority is to reduce the burden of dealing with a number of applications of the type to which permission is almost always given.
 I am grateful to the hon. Member for Spelthorne for that recommendation, and as my hon. Friend the previous Minister said we are sympathetic to its aims. It is important for developers to have the certainty that if they have started but not completed work that they were permitted to carry out at the time at which they stopped, they will be able to complete it even if the permitted development rights are subsequently removed. New clause 4 will therefore allow the Secretary of State to include in a development order, and local planning authorities to include in a local development order, a provision enabling the completion of development for which planning permission has been granted by the order and which 
 has been started but not completed before that planning permission is withdrawn. 
 Amendment No. 32 is related and it provides that compensation provisions do not apply where a development order includes a provision allowing the completion of work that has started before permission is withdrawn. The purpose of that is to make it clear that a developer who can complete development that was previously permitted cannot also claim compensation in relation to the withdrawal of the permission. As a result, a developer can complete his or her development or apply for planning permission, but if it is refused he or she will not be entitled to compensation. 
 Amendments Nos. 5, 6 and 31 are a consequence of new clause 4, which will introduce a proposed new section 61D to the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. There is already a new section 61D, so references to it need to be changed to 61E. Amendments Nos. 6 and 31 will change the number in the references to the proposed new section that will be introduced by clause 40 from 61D to 61E. Amendment No. 5 makes it clear that the proposed new section that will be introduced by clause 40 should be inserted in the 1990 Act after new section 61D, not 61C as stated in the Bill.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: We start on a good note. I am pleased to see that the Government have given due weight to the sensible suggestion of my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne, which has given rise to new clause 4. That is why we, the official Opposition, have co-signed the Government's amendment in that respect and are pleased that they have taken notice. If a development has started and planning permission is subsequently revoked, it is eminently sensible that it should be possible for it to continue. Otherwise one would have the absurd situation whereby a development that was halfway through would have to be stopped and might remain derelict for many years.
 We also welcome amendment No. 6, which will have the opposite effect. If the development has started and planning permission is subsequently revoked, one would not expect compensation to be paid. We also welcome the consequential amendment No. 5, and amendments Nos. 31 and 32. 
 I have one question for the Minister on the new clause. He says that the purpose of local development orders is to allow the local planning authority to permit a class of development. In other words, they would expand the existing permission under the 1995 order, but can a local development order be used to restrict the rights under that order? My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Mr. Turner) has tabled an amendment in relation to agricultural subdivisions, although we are not discussing that now—I merely use it as an example and do not want to get on to that debate. However, there is a problem with issuing article 4 directions to restrict the 1995 order, so it would be useful to know whether local authorities could use the relevant mechanism to restrict a class of permitted development rights as well as expand it.

Matthew Green: I welcome the new clause and the four amendments. It was welcome that the hon. Member for Spelthorne spotted the point in question during our previous proceedings—I think that it was one of the few occasions on which he did not mention terminal 5 at Heathrow and we were probably grateful for that at the time. However, he was right to raise the issue and the Government were right to bring it forward. The provisions deal with an anomaly that would have existed in the Bill in its original form, so I am glad to see them.

Sydney Chapman: I want to raise one point. Incidentally, perhaps it would be appropriate to declare at the outset what I perceive to be inverted interests. I am member of the Royal Institute of British Architects and a fellow of the Royal Town Planning Institute, although I have just applied for retired status in both august bodies. I am an honorary member of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, the Landscape Institute and a few others that do not regularly come to mind, but I shall put them down on a piece of paper if necessary. I do not think that those are declarable interests because I used to pay to belong to the Royal Institute of British Architects and the Royal Town Planning Institute—I wished that it was the other way round, but it never was.
 It is obvious that I am not a lawyer, but, even if the Bill is technically correct, I am worried, as a layman, about proposed new section 61D(1), which new clause 4 will insert in the principal Act. It states: 
''A development order or local development order may include provision permitting the completion of development''.
 I agree with what the Minister is trying to do and I supported my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne when he first raised the issue in Committee, but surely the subsection should state that a relevant order must, rather than may, include provision permitting the completion of development. 
 The word ''may'', which would leave the option to the local planning authority, would not be satisfactory. Some planning authorities might, for political reasons, not want a development to be permitted even though it had started. I should be grateful if the Minister could look into that point and reassure me that t every planning authority would have an obligation to allow such developments to be completed once they had been started.

Andrew Turner: Unlike my hon. Friends and the hon. Member for Ludlow, I have a little difficulty with the new clause, because I do not understand it. That might in some circumstances be regarded as a reason to shut up, but I should like to go through the provision so that the Minister can explain whether I have understood it correctly.
 Subsection (1) of the proposed new section 61D states: 
''A development order . . . may include provision permitting the completion of the development''.
 Subsection (2), however, states: 
''Planning permission granted by a development order is withdrawn—
(a) if the order is revoked''.
 Does that include the planning permission covered by subsection (1), enabling the development to be completed? A normal reading of subsection (2) would be that if the order were revoked and planning permission were withdrawn that would include the permission to complete the development after the order was revoked.

Keith Hill: I am sure that the Committee will be fascinated by the expression ''inverted interests'', used by my erstwhile fellow Barnetonian the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet—an idea that presents great opportunities for speculation. In the course of our proceedings it will become obvious that, like him, I am not a lawyer.
 It seems to me that all the hon. Members who have spoken have raised essentially the same matter. The hon. Member for Cotswold asked whether a local development order could be used to restrict a class of developments, and the answer is yes. The hon. Members for Chipping Barnet and for Isle of Wight raised questions about the completion of a project once it had been started. Once a development has commenced, the developer will of course have the right to complete it. That is clear. Issues arise, of course, about the definition of ''started'', and those are dealt with in section 56 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. 
 It would be for the local planning authority to decide whether development had started in a particular case. For example, a development of 20 units might have been started, but work might have begun on only five units. The question then is: would the entire development retain its permission, or would permission be granted only for the five units where development had started? In the first instance, that will be for local planning authorities to decide. Ultimately, however, it will be for the courts to determine permission in the light of particular circumstances. The long and short of it is that a developer who has lawfully commenced the work has the lawful right to complete it, provided that there is clear agreement about the extent of the development. The local planning authority could exert some rights if, for example, the work was to be carried out over a period of time in a series of stages involving a different set of units. That seems to be to be a reasonable proposition in the context of the rights of local planning authorities and the local democratic process. 
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: On a point of order, Mr. Hurst. I must apologise to the Committee because, as my hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet has reminded me, I failed to declare my interests. I am a fellow of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors and practised as a planning surveyor, among other things. I also have properties, which are declared in the Register of Members' Interests. Those properties are not currently covered by the Bill, but they could be at some point in the future.

Alan Hurst: The Committee will be grateful to the hon. Gentleman.

New clause 5 - Crown

'(1) 'This Act (except Part 7) binds the Crown. 
 (2) The amendments made by Part 7 apply to the Crown to the extent that the enactments amended so apply.'.—[Keith Hill.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Keith Hill: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Government new clause 6—Crown application of planning Acts. 
 Government new clause 14—Crown application: transitional. 
 Government new clause 16—Subordinate legislation. 
 Government new clause 41—Crown application of Scottish planning Acts. 
 Government new clause 45—Subordinate legislation: Scotland. 
 Government new schedule 1—Crown application. 
 Government new schedule 2—Transitional provisions: Crown application. 
 Government new schedule 3—Crown application: Scotland. 
 Government amendments Nos. 53 to 55 
 Government amendments Nos. 330 to 332 
 Government amendment No. 334. 
 Government amendment No. 336.

Keith Hill: We are about to embark on a series of debates on 21 new clauses, three new schedules and 10 other amendments, all of which deal with the Crown's immunity under the planning Acts. Before we do so, and with your permission, Mr. Hurst, it might be helpful if I again give some of the background to the proposals.
 As members of the Committee will know, legislation does not bind the Crown unless there is express provision for it to do so. A series of court decisions have confirmed that the planning Acts do not bind the Crown. There is also a policy, which Administrations of all political persuasions follow, that Crown immunity should be removed where it is unnecessary. Hon. Members may recall, for example, that Crown immunity was removed from the national health service in 1991. 
 The fact that the planning Acts do not bind the Crown does not mean that development by the Crown is unregulated. Such proposed development follows the procedures in DOE circular 18/84, under which the Crown submits a notice of proposed development to the local planning authority instead of a planning application. That notice is treated in a similar way to a planning application in that it is advertised and entered on to the register. The Crown can go ahead with the proposed development if the local planning authority is content with it. If it is not, the dispute is referred to the First Secretary of State for his determination. In large cases, this is usually done 
 following a non-statutory public inquiry, which is governed by the spirit of the usual inquiry procedure rules and which results in an inspector's report and a decision by the Secretary of State similar to that following a recovered appeal. 
 I shall now return to the policy of ending Crown immunity. In 1992, the Government issued a consultation paper on the removal of Crown immunity from planning law. The outcome of the consultation on that paper was a ministerial announcement in 1994 that the Crown's immunity from planning control would be removed as soon as a suitable legislative opportunity arose. That was endorsed by the present Government in 1998 in response to a parliamentary question. 
 New clause 5 heads a large group dealing with the mechanics of bringing the Crown inside the scope of planning legislation; it provides that the Bill will bind the Crown. New clause 6 provides that the existing planning Acts will henceforth bind the Crown. I shall talk briefly about new schedule 1, which is introduced by new clause 6 with Government amendments Nos. 53 to 55. It deals with the adjustments to the planning Acts that will be required to accommodate the Crown, and the necessary repeals. 
 The next topic will be the transitional provisions from the non-statutory to the statutory scheme, set out in new clause 14 and new schedule 2. I shall end with new clause 16, which provides the means for existing subordinate legislation to bind the Crown. That might be some way off, however, for I have much still to explain to the Committee. 
 The provisions in new clause 5 are pretty straightforward. In subsection (1), ''This Act'' means the Bill when it is enacted, if that is Parliament's will. The exclusion regarding part 7 and the proviso in subsection (2) are an aid to interpretation, in that we are removing Crown immunity from planning legislation, and part 7 deals with compulsory purchase. Compulsory purchase by the Crown is similar to compulsory purchase by local authorities and others. However, we thought that such clarification would make it certain that applying the Act to the Crown did not cut across the application of any other legislation. The Crown has immunity from compulsory purchase orders under the planning Acts, and it is intended that it will retain it. 
 New clause 6 is at the heart of the Crown immunity amendments. The reason for legislating is that the planning Acts do not bind the Crown, and it provides that they will do so in future. As proposed new section 292A(1) says: 
''This Act binds the Crown.''
 Some might say that that is sufficient. If we could have stopped there, we would have done. Alas, life is rarely as simple as that, and we have had to go further. Although the Crown will have to obtain planning permission, listed building consent and hazardous substances consent in the normal way, it still requires special provision for enforcement, national security and urgent development. We shall deal with all three elements in detail later, but new clause 6 includes some elements of the enforcement regime. Because the 
 principal Act, the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended, is so large and complex—it has 337 clauses and 17 schedules—we decided to adopt a more general approach. That is why the statement in new section 292A(1) is qualified by subsection (2) in that it is subject to express provision made by part 13 of the principal Act. 
 The Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990, known as the listed buildings Act, and the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990, known as the hazardous substances Act, are both much shorter and are restricted in scope, so we can be more prescriptive about which provisions should not apply to the Crown. Those are listed in proposed new section 82A(2) of the listed buildings Act and proposed new section 30A(2) of the hazardous substances Act and deal mainly with offences, injunctions, rights of entry and warrants to enter land. There is more detail about rights of entry and enforcement in later amendments. 
 So far, it might be said, so good. However, for those Members who are already having trouble following the explanation, this is the moment to lie back and think of England. I fear that proposed new section 82A(3) in new clause 6(2) needs to be explained in a little more detail. I assure the Committee that this is an attempt to avoid throwing the baby out with the bathwater. New section 82A(2)(a) states that section 9 of the listed buildings Act 1990 will not bind the Crown. Section 9 sets out the offence of doing works to a listed building without the consent required by section 7 of that Act. Section 9(3) provides statutory defences for that offence. If a person carried out urgent works necessary for health and safety or for the preservation of the building, and it was not practicable to do works of repair or provide temporary support or shelter instead of doing those works, if the works done were the minimum measures immediately necessary, and if notice in writing justifying the works was given to the local planning authority as soon as reasonably practicable, that person would be safe from prosecution. 
 The Crown may be safe from prosecution, but without the provision in proposed new section 82A(3) in new clause 6 it will have no power to undertake emergency works in those circumstances. That means that the Crown could not legally carry out emergency works in a situation where a private person could, which is clearly unsatisfactory. We therefore have a principle that where offences have been disapplied, we have to add back in any statutory defences as a positive right for the Crown so that the Crown has the same freedom of action as a private person. That is the effect of proposed new section 82A(3). It may sound complicated, but it does make sense. We will return to that theme when we debate new clause 13. 
 As well as proposed new section 30A of the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990, which I have already mentioned, new clause 6(3) also contains proposed new section 30B, which contains transitional provisions. They are very similar to those given to 
 industry by the Act when it came into force. They allow Crown bodies to claim a deemed consent within six months of commencement of new clause 6(3) for hazardous substances present in the appropriate quantities during the 12 months prior to commencement. The requirements of the Act do not apply to military establishments. We do not believe that there are significant holdings of hazardous substances held by the Crown elsewhere. 
 Subsection (4) of new clause 6 introduces new schedule 1, entitled ''Crown application'', which amends the planning Acts in relation to their application to the Crown. New schedule 1 is a varied and complex set of provisions—the Acts need to be amended as a result of the Crown being bound by the Acts when it has not been so bound previously. The new schedule includes repeals of redundant provisions, some with savings, and provisions preserved from repealed sections. Some new provisions are required because the Crown is now bound by the Acts and there are adaptations of existing provisions for use by the Crown. Amendments Nos. 53 to 55 add the substantive repeals in new schedule 1 and new clause 11 to the list in schedule 6. I am sure that it will come as a relief to the Committee that I do not propose to describe each set of provisions in detail. I have no doubt that Members will raise any issues that concern them. 
 I turn to the arrangements that we need so that we can deal with the transition from a non-statutory to a statutory planning system. New clause 14 introduces schedule 2, which makes the necessary provisions. Members of the Committee will be aware that the Crown submits notices of proposed development following the guidance contained in Department of the Environment circular 18/84, instead of applying for planning permission or listed building consent. New schedule 2 is in two parts—the first for notices akin to planning applications and the second for notices akin to applications for listed building consent. They are substantively identical, so I shall address my remarks to the first part only. 
 After an introductory segment that deals with application definitions, there are three substantive segments. The first provides that notices that have been approved before commencement of new clause 6(1) are to be treated as if they were grants of planning permission. The second provides that where notices are in dispute and have been referred to the Secretary of State, who has not made a determination before commencement, such notices shall be treated as recovered appeals. The third provides that a notice that has been submitted to the local planning authority but is still being considering at commencement should be treated as an application for planning permission. 
 New clause 16 is the final provision in the group. As well as making the planning Acts binding on the Crown, we also need to make the existing subordinate legislation binding where necessary. Unfortunately, the existing subordinate legislation will not automatically become so because the enabling Acts did not allow that when it was made. To make the subordinate legislation bind the Crown, new clause 16 gives the Secretary of State a power to make an order 
 defining which existing planning subordinate legislation will bind the Crown, either as it stands or with modification. 
 I hope that my remarks have been helpful to the Committee. Admittedly, the issue is complex, but I have sought to offer a guiding thread of clarification through the maze of new clauses and amendments.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I welcome the Minister's explanation of a large group of amendments that contains the wholly new principle of binding the Crown. Incidentally, the Crown is already bound in a number of respects under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, to which he referred, so the provisions merely extend that principle, which we welcome.
 The Minister's explanation was a little torturous—he was jumping backwards and forwards from a new clause to a new schedule, and back to the new clause again. However, I shall deal with the new clauses in the order that they have been selected. The main question for him involves the cost of compliance. What is the cost of compliance to the local planning authorities of dealing with the additional number of planning applications? Incidentally, does he have an estimate of the number of planning applications that will now be introduced? What is the cost to Departments of having to prepare those planning applications, the possible appeals that may follow and the delay in carrying out normal developments? It would be extremely useful if he told us that. 
 In principle we welcome new clause 5, which merely binds the Crown to the provisions and all subsequent Acts. However, in giving that welcome we believe that the Crown should as far as possible be bound in all respects. I have a little problem with this huge group of amendments: the Minister says that the Crown is to be bound, yet at many points he is saying, ''Ah, yes, but the Crown isn't going to be bound in this respect.'' If one accepts the principle that the Crown is bound, all other consequences should as far as possible follow from that. If someone commits an offence, whether they work for the Crown, a private company or an individual, there is no reason why they should be bound by a different law. I therefore have a little problem in that respect. 
 The Minister started on that course by mentioning paragraphs (a) to (j) of proposed new section 82A(2) of the listed buildings Act, which new clause 6 introduces. He said that the Crown was not bound in those respects in order, in his words, to accommodate the Crown, but the Crown should be bound as far as possible. Of those paragraphs, (a) refers to offences to listed buildings, (b) and (c) to false statements, (d) to enforcement, (e) to penalties, (f) to retentions, (g) to urgent works, (h) to recovery of expenses, (i) to damage to listed buildings and (j) to rights of entry. With the possible exception of (g) and (j)—some of the property will be sensitive and we do not want to enable every Tom, Dick and Harry to go into every Crown property on a whim—there is no reason for the Crown to be exempt from those provisions. I would be grateful if the Minister explained the matter. 
 The Minister, later in his explanation of new clause 6, skated over the contents of section 30B of the hazardous substances Act, saying that they were the same as those relating to commercial properties, but the Crown has some complex properties, some of which suffer complex pollution. Will a transitional period of six months and an establishment period of 12 months be long enough for the Crown and all Departments to get their heads round the problem? 
 I turn to new clause 16, which the Minister described as a tidying-up clause and under which the Government may produce subordinate legislation. He has helpfully given us a large tome of subordinate legislation for the Bill, but the explanatory memorandum does not mention any subordinate legislation relating to new clause 16. The Bill is so complex and so much paper is required that I ask him—this is not a criticism—whether we can have an indication of what might be put in the secondary legislation under new clause 16, even if we cannot see the text. 
 New clause 45 details the separate provisions that, of course, apply in Scotland. I understand that only too well, but I ask the Minister what discussions he has had with the Scottish Parliament on the matter. It would be anomalous if Crown immunity were to apply in England but not in Scotland. The same Ministry would have to deal with property differently in each country. As far as possible, the same treatment should apply. I also raise the problem of Scotland in relation to new schedule 1, which concerns purchase notices, having in mind the situation in Scotland with regard to land. Can the Minister clarify whether the Scottish Parliament or a delegated planning authority could refuse a planning permission and then issue a purchase notice? I hope that that is not the case. 
 Large portions of the new clauses and new sections bind not only the Crown but, as is made clear in new schedule 1, Her Majesty in right to her private estates. They bind 
''land belonging to Her Majesty in right of the Duchy of Lancaster; land belonging to the Duchy of Cornwall;''
 and 
''land which forms part of the Crown Estate.''
 That could have far-reaching consequences. What consultation took place with representatives of Her Majesty in relation to her private land, the Duchy of Lancaster and the Duchy of Cornwall and with the Crown Estate Commissioners? Are any anomalies created by the new schedule? I think of the planning law that applies to Guernsey and Jersey, the Isles of Scilly and other territories such as the Isle of Man, where anomalous situations may arise that fall between every stool. I suspect that that will not be the case, but I would like an assurance from the Minister. 
 I now move on to paragraph 3 of the new schedule, which effectively precludes land from compulsory acquisition—again, using the dictum that the Crown should not be bound. I am not sure why the Crown should be excluded from compulsory acquisition. After all, if an urban development corporation had 
 to accumulate a large enough piece of land to carry out a development—for instance, the Thames gateway, which the Government have trumpeted so much—the compulsory acquisition of some Crown lands would be necessary. Crown lands are immune under the Act, but I expect that the Crown would agree to be part of such a development. I wonder how the mechanism will work. I also wonder why most Crown land should be exempt from compulsory acquisition. 
 Paragraph 10 of this long new schedule will introduce new section 298A, on applications for planning permission by the Crown. Subsection (1) states: 
''This section applies to an application for planning permission or for a certificate under section 192 made by or on behalf of the Crown.''
 Subsection (2) states: 
''The Secretary of State may by regulations modify or exclude any statutory provision relating to the making and determination of such applications.''
 If the Crown is to be bound, why should it not follow the normal route for planning applications? Why should the Secretary of State be given the power to vary that procedure? 
 Paragraph 10(2) states: 
''Section 299 of the principal Act is omitted.''
 Section 299 deals with deemed planning permission. Again, I wonder why it should be omitted. 
 Paragraph 17 of this vast new schedule introduces new section 330A, which gives the Secretary of State the power to require information. It clearly states: 
''Section 330 does not apply to an interest to which this section applies''—
 that is, to the Crown. I see no reason why the Crown should not be required by a local planning authority or an urban development corporation to give information—unless, for instance, it would be in the national interest that the information remain secret. In the normal run of things, I do not see why the Crown should be exempt from giving information. 
 New section 330A (4) states: 
''The appropriate authority must comply with a request under subsection (3) except to the extent . . . (b) that to do so will disclose information as to any of the matters mentioned in section 321(4).
 National security is covered by the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which also covers security of premises—but it is a blanket provision, and I do not see why the Crown should be exempt from giving information. I would like to know why the Crown will not regularly use the defence of national security or the security of buildings to evade some of those provisions. 
 Paragraph 24(3) states: 
''In subsection (3) after 'in which there is' there is inserted 'a Crown interest or'.''
 I think that that is a drafting error, because it refers to section 297, which paragraph 23 deletes. Will the Minister look into that, and see whether I am right? 
 Paragraph 26 deals with section 300 of the principal Act and says that tree preservation orders will not apply to the Crown. Why? I see no reason why the tree preservation order legislation should not apply to the Crown. This is another instance of our binding the Crown, but not really. 
 Paragraph 3(2) of new schedule 2, on ''Acceptable development'', states: 
''The notice must be treated as if it is planning permission granted under Part 3 of the principal Act.''
 Again, I ask the Minister why. Why should not a normal planning application be made? 
 Amendments Nos. 53, 54 and 55 are consequential and we therefore welcome them. I think that amendment No. 332, which would insert the words ''or 84(2)'' at the end of clause 87(5)(a), contains a drafting error and should refer to ''81(2)'' instead. If that is so, what about a reference to section 81(3)? That should be covered too. If I am wrong, perhaps the Minister could explain where the provision mentioned in the amendment is to be found. I could not find it. 
 In principle, we should have liked the Crown to be bound pretty well universally. I shall be particularly interested to hear from the Minister—on subsequent amendments as well as the present group—how we are to avoid allowing the Crown, if it does not want to do something, simply to use the defence of the national interest, secrecy, security of buildings, and so on. That defence should be used only when it is really necessary. I do not want to prejudge future discussions, but how do we know that that defence will not also be used for contentious planning applications?

Matthew Green: I can now say something that I did not often say when we met in January: the hon. Member for Cotswold has done the Committee a great service. There is broad agreement in the Committee that the ending of aspects of Crown immunity is very welcome, and such agreement often means that hon. Members do not look too hard at the amendments. The hon. Member for Cotswold has done the Committee a service in delving into the detail to work out some of the possible consequences. I look forward to the Minister's explanations. We do not want the announcement of the ending of Crown immunity to be accompanied by the leaving of loopholes that could be exploited—not by the present Minister, but perhaps by others in the future.
 I am particularly concerned about new clause 16, which would permit the Secretary of State to modify subordinate legislation dating from before the Bill. Clearly modification will be needed to some extent, but I am concerned about whether that will enable a Minister to bring forward statutory instruments with the opposite tendency later. The Minister may be moved to ensure that subordinate legislation is brought into line with what is intended under the Act, but perhaps new clause 16 would enable a future Minister, without further primary legislation, substantially to alter relevant provisions. If so, could a safeguard be included in the Bill? 
 I welcome this group of new clauses and amendments; they have been sought for some time, 
 and will end an anomaly that has served the state ill, because they give the appearance of an over-mighty state. Bringing the relevant matters back into line with more normal planning applications is something to be welcomed. However, I intend to listen to the detail of the Minister's explanations in response to the hon. Member for Cotswold, who has spotted some aspects that need attention.

Sydney Chapman: I join the hon. Member for Ludlow in congratulating not only my hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold on his reply to the Minister, but the Minister on his introduction of what is, by any definition, a very large series. I have made a note of what is involved: 24 new clauses, three new schedules and 29 amendments. This raft of amendments is immensely complex, and comprehensive. Therefore, I am grateful to the Minister and my hon. Friend for their comments. I now see the picture much more clearly.
 I shall raise two points, the first of which is rather technical. I want to be helpful and constructive, and do not want to spring this on the Minister suddenly if and when we reach clause 89, but although he has spoken about various aspects of the new clauses referring to Scotland in relation to specific matters, clause 89 states: 
''This Act''
 —assuming that it will become an Act— 
''extends to England and Wales only.''
 The Minister may be able to explain that the clause is still correct as a result of the amendments, but I make the point now as an early warning that he may need to amend the clause further. 
 Secondly, not only this raft of new clauses but many other Government new clauses and amendments—let alone the Opposition's—will significantly change the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. They will also change other legislation. I suggest to the Minister that if and when the Bill is enacted, the Government might find it appropriate, at a convenient time in the not too distant future, to introduce a consolidated town and country planning Bill. It would be helpful to those who practise or participate in that area, or who are governed by it, to have all new legislation on town and country planning in one Act—I was going to say ''one simple Act'', but it will not be a simple one.

Andrew Turner: I, too, welcome the general thrust of the amendments. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold for the detail in which he discussed new schedule 1.
 I am sure that I am not alone in having a listed prison in my constituency, so I am interested to know why the Minister believes that it is necessary to exclude listed buildings from the application of the legislation. I understand why it is necessary to exclude buildings for security reasons, and avoid undue publicity about details of security arrangements, but why are listed buildings exempt as a class? 
 Will the Minister also clarify who the Crown is? At some points that is clear. In paragraph 6(4)(f) of schedule 1, it appears that the Crown 
''in relation to Westminster Hall and the Chapel of St Mary Undercroft, means the Lord Great Chamberlain and the Speakers of the House of Lords and the House of Commons acting jointly''.
 Who is the Crown in other circumstances? Is it the Secretary of State of the Department that holds the property involved, or is it the head of the executive agency of that Department: for example, the Prison Service? Clearly, in one or two cases it is Her Majesty.

Sydney Chapman: My hon. Friend has raised an interesting point. Everyone tends to think that the royal prerogative describes powers that Her Majesty the Queen has. She does have one or two powers, but many are exercised by Ministers.

Andrew Turner: I thank my hon. Friend. I ask the question because if ''the Crown'' can mean the Secretary of State, there will be circumstances—

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I can probably answer my hon. Friend's question; I am desperately trying to find the answer in this group of amendments. It says that the appropriate authority would usually be the Secretary of State, except in the case of the Duchy of Cornwall, the Duchy of Lancaster and Her Majesty, where other provisions apply. In the case of a dispute, the provisions of the 1990 Act, whereby the Treasury arbitrates on the matter and has absolute authority in it, come into force.

Andrew Turner: Good. We are making progress, and I thank my hon. Friend for his assistance.
 The point of the question, however, is what happens when the Secretary of State is the Deputy Prime Minister or his successor with responsibility for planning legislation. The Secretary of State appoints the inspectors and has certain powers to take decisions, so how can he be judge and jury in a case involving Crown land that he holds?

Keith Hill: First, I join members of the Committee in congratulating the hon. Member for Cotswold. He obviously has a professional background in these matters. His contribution was nothing less than a tour de force, and I am sure that members of the Committee will want to congratulate him on it. I know from my own experience how difficult it often is as a member of the Opposition to develop an effective critique of proposed Government measures without the backing of the enormous resources of the Government. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will take it in the appropriate spirit—I am not being patronising—when I say that I fully admire the questions that he asked.
 I was also struck by the radical tone of the hon. Gentleman's remarks. Here we have a Conservative Member protesting about continuing gaps in the bringing of the Crown and its various emanations under the aegis of the law. This obviously reflects a new development in the Conservative party, which we will want to follow very carefully.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: Flattery achieves much, but I am not about to transfer myself to the Government Benches.

Keith Hill: I may have been making the subtle suggestion that the hon. Gentleman might, in the
 current circumstances, make a bid for the leadership of the Conservative party.
 Let me make a general observation about Crown exemption and the Crown's response to the planning and compulsory purchase process. There is an opaqueness to various aspects of the Bill, which I believe will remain a moot point throughout our consideration of it, about the way in which Crown institutions respond to aspects of planning law. The point is that the Crown may not be compelled to comply, but it is, above all, the custodian of the law, and we expect it to pursue the requirements of the law as extensively and in as many circumstances as possible. There is no body higher than the Crown upon which it is more incumbent to pursue the law. 
 Other hon. Gentlemen have asked many questions, all of which I shall attempt to answer. My approach may be a little ragged, but I am sure that the Committee will understand. I shall deal first with the easiest question, in which the hon. Member for Cotswold identified drafting errors, as did the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet. A drafting error may be a printing error. We had a lot of trouble getting the material down on paper at the time, and we are still trying catch up with making the corrections. I assure the Committee that I shall not react to any corrections that need to be made to drafting errors with the level of resistance that was displayed by the Government on earlier occasions. 
 The hon. Member for Cotswold asked about the cost of planning applications. I am delighted to say that even before inspiration winged its way to me I had the answer to that question. I assure the hon. Gentleman that there will be no new costs to the Government. Planning applications replace notices of proposed development. The only extra cost to the Crown will be in relation to planning fees; beyond that there will be no extra costs. To remind the Committee, the current procedure is that the Crown puts in a notice of proposed development under DOE circular 18/84. It is then treated as a planning application, so there will be no additional costs in practice. I hope that that reassures the hon. Gentleman.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I am grateful to the Minister. I hope that my comments about his flattery did not appear churlish—I thought after I sat down that they might have done—because I accept his comments in the spirit in which he meant them.
 I beg to disagree with the Minister's idea that there will be no costs for the Government. The Crown is now being bound and there will be a planning application, which means that in some instances there will be appeals. Those appeals are likely to be complex, because the applications are likely to be large. That will presumably cost money and will take longer than under the circular 18/84 procedure, because there is a planning application. Under the old procedure the Crown just notified the local planning authority and then got on with things. Under the new procedure there will be a gambit of applying for planning permission and probably going to all the committees, which takes time, and some 
 planning authorities will not meet the eight-week deadline. There must therefore be some cost in the process and if the Minister does not have the figures, as he may well not, I would be grateful if he would write to the Committee, perhaps with a revised estimate of the costs, and put a note in the Library.

Keith Hill: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. If we find that extra costs will be entailed in the process, I shall drop a note to the Committee as he suggests.
 The hon. Gentleman mentioned rights of entry. Inspiration is winging its way to me now, which I dare say will be dealt with in due course. I shall say something about rights of entry if I can find the section in my brief headed ''If pressed''. As I have been pressed, I intend to say a word about rights of entry—but I am not sure that I can find the section on rights of entry.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: May I suggest to the Minister that rights of entry might also be the subject of the note that is coming from his officials?

Keith Hill: That is too kind, but I shall attempt to deal with the point if I hit upon the relevant section in the notes that have reached me already.
 The hon. Gentleman asked a question about compulsory acquisition—[Interruption.] Ah! Rights of entry have finally arrived, and I shall deal with them. 
 The hon. Gentleman asked about compulsory acquisition, which relates to the law on purchase notices, which I gather resides in a rather dusty corner of the principal Act, so I congratulate him again on having dug it up. For hon. Members who are interested, I can explain that the relevant provisions are in chapter I of part VI of the 1990 Act. Purchase notices are widely used because the conditions for obtaining them are tightly drawn, as the hon. Gentleman evidently knows. They are a form of reverse compulsory purchase, whereby the owner of the land can under certain conditions require the local planning authority to buy it from them if a planning decision has resulted in the land being incapable of reasonably beneficial use in its existing state. There is more to the issue than that, but I hope that that brief explanation will be sufficient to enable the Committee to understand the amendments. 
 Proposed new section 137A, which paragraph 1 inserts into the principal Act, does two other things. First, subsections (2) and (4) preserve the effect of section 296(3) and (4) of the principal Act. That allows the owner of a private interest in Crown land to serve a purchase notice only if he has offered his interest to the appropriate authority for that type of Crown land on equivalent terms, and that offer has been refused. Equivalent terms are those that would be repayable were it acquired in pursuance of a purchase notice. That procedure gives the Crown first refusal on an unwanted interest in the land, rather than its being passed to the local authority. 
 The second element is in subsection (3) of proposed new section 137A, which arises from the fact that the Crown will have to apply for planning permission, and that it could be adversely affected by a refusal of permission. Purchase notices exist to protect the 
 private and commercial interests of landowners. The Crown, in general, does not have such interests. As the Crown maintains immunity from compulsory purchase under the planning Acts, it is not generally appropriate for it to be able to enforce a quasi-compulsory purchase on a local planning authority. The types of land set out in paragraphs (a) to (d) of proposed new section 137A(3) are different in that Her Majesty's private estates are just that—private. The Duchies of Lancaster and Cornwall and the Crown Estates operate in the private sector similarly to other landed estates, and have commercial interests that could be adversely affected by refusal of planning permission. It is therefore appropriate that they should have the ability to serve purchase notices as private interests do. 
 Paragraph 2 inserts new section 32A into the listed buildings Act, which colleagues have mentioned. This is a similar provision for listed building purchase notices. The eagle-eyed hon. Member for Cotswold may have noticed that proposed new section 137A(5) on interpretation has no equivalent in proposed new section 32A. That is because the Crown definitions in the principal Act apply only to part 13, whereas those in the listed buildings Act apply to the whole Act. A subsection on interpretation is therefore not necessary for the listed buildings Act. I hope that that goes some way to satisfying the hon. Gentleman. 
 Other hon. Members have raised the matter of compulsory purchase. Paragraphs 3 and 4 aim to preserve the effect of section 296(2)(b) of the principal Act. That says that Crown land cannot be acquired compulsorily under part 9 of the principal Act, dealing with acquisition and appropriation of land, unless the appropriate authority consents. There are two acquisition powers in part 9: section 226, which enables local planning authorities to acquire land—mainly for development, redevelopment and improvement—and section 228, which enables the First Secretary of State to acquire land for the public service. Paragraph 3 amends section 226 and paragraph 4 amends section 228 accordingly. Paragraph 5 is a similar provision for the listed buildings Act thats preserves the effect of section 83(2)(b) of that Act by amending section 47. 
 I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for having allowed me to clarify those matters for the record.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. I shall skate quickly over his words in relation to compulsory purchase of Crown land unless the acquiring authority gives permission, but we all know that many city centres contain large blocks of Crown land that are not being properly utilised. If the local planning authority wished to acquire such land compulsorily, but was blocked by, say, the Secretary of State for Health, who was sitting on a vital piece of land that was needed for affordable housing, it is possible that the Act could seek to remedy the situation. I am not sure that we are doing the right thing by allowing blanket Crown exemption from compulsory acquisition, and I would be grateful for the Minister's comments.

Keith Hill: The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. As a housing Minister, I am discovering that he
 is right about the cost of under-using Government land, and that of agencies associated with Government, in key areas, many of which, as the hon. Gentleman says, are in inner cities. We are certainly not moving towards the power of compulsory purchase at this stage.
 I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will be interested to know that we have recently reinforced again, through guidance, the requirement for such bodies to notify the local planning authority as a first recourse when land becomes available for disposal and is utilised. 
 In broader terms, my Department is doing its level best as a matter of policy to ensure that other Departments are aware of the possible value for housing and development purposes of the land on which they are sitting. In some cases, we are beginning to see a positive result. 
Matthew Green rose—

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I apologise to the hon. Member for Ludlow for jumping in ahead of him, but I want to pursue my point.
 We need a more proactive system. The Government are imposing all sorts of duties and obligations on local authorities to produce a housing plan, among other things. We now have a regional aspect to planning. Local authorities should be encouraged to be more proactive to encourage Departments to give up bits of land in our inner cities that they are not utilising properly. We are missing an opportunity here.

Keith Hill: I sympathise deeply with the hon. Gentleman's observation.

Matthew Green: May I add to the general tone? I can foresee situations in which small parts of Crown land might block access to the redevelopment of a town or city centre. In effect, therefore, the Crown would have a veto power over a planning application. Even if the local authority were to grant permission for a redevelopment, the fact that the land could not be accessed would block the redevelopment if compulsory purchase were not available.
 I am not suggesting that the Government would seek to do that out of spite, but powers of compulsory purchase act as a forceful reminder that a Department might want to get on with making a certain piece of land available. If a local authority does not have that power, I can foresee the equivalent of a ransom strip, as I believe they are sometimes called in planning, with the Crown holding out and through sheer bureaucracy taking for ever to come up with a sale that is necessary for a much needed development to go ahead.

Keith Hill: I understand the hon. Gentleman's point. The Government's broad response would be to expect the Crown to be responsive to such a need. In many cases, this is a matter of public policy. We would certainly expect co-operation and sensitivity to local planning requirements, which, as he knows, will shortly require statutory status at regional level. We therefore expect the Crown to be sympathetic and helpful in such circumstances.

Andrew Turner: I do not want to particularise too much, but the Minister's express desire that the Crown should be helpful is not borne out by experience. It is certainly not borne out in my constituency or, I am sure, in other Members' constituencies. The Home Office holds large areas of land in my constituency, which are called prison estates. Three prisons are built on them, and they are very large areas of undeveloped land. For many years, my predecessor, my predecessor's predecessor and I have tried to persuade Governments of both major parties to allow that land to be properly developed. Neither my predecessors nor I had sufficient leverage to persuade the Government to get on with it. The result is that acres of land suitable for housing development are not being developed.

Keith Hill: I can understand the hon. Gentleman's frustration. His is a crowded island, although it is not far away, and there is considerable demand for new housing. However, although I have registered my understanding, it would be wrong of me to trespass on decisions that may or may not have been taken for various reasons by the Home Office in relation to the prisons estate. As a Minister, one rapidly learns how dangerous it can be to invade the territory of another Department. I have no intention of doing so now, but I undertake to consider the matter if the hon. Gentleman writes to me in my housing capacity.
 I shall now deal with other points involving rights of entry raised by the hon. Member for Cotswold. Under the planning Acts, local planning authorities have several reasons to enter property. Enforcement is one. That is dealt with in new clause 11, which we shall debate in due course. Others include the need to survey the land in connection with the development planning process. Those reasons are governed by section 324 of the principal Act, with supplementary provisions being made in section 325. 
 Our policy is that entry to Crown land should be with permission only, so new section 325A, which is introduced by paragraph 13 of new schedule 1, applies section 324 with the necessary modifications. New section 325A states: 
''A person must not enter Crown land unless he has the relevant permission.''
 That expression is defined in subsection (3). The matter is germane to the point made by the hon. Gentleman, because we want the local planning authority to able to arrange entry to sites locally—generally by approaching the person in charge of the site. 
 If entry is refused, the local planning authority can ask permission of the appropriate authority, such as a Department's headquarters. That accounts for the formulation of proposed new section 325A(3)(a), which says that 
''a person appearing to the person seeking entry to the land to be entitled to give''
 permission would be the site manager or his deputy, or the head of accommodation services. The local planning authority has to be reasonably diligent about who it asks. For example, it would not have relevant permission if it had asked the cleaner 
 sweeping the front doorstep whether it was okay to come in and the cleaner had said that he was ''relaxed'' about it. In practice, entry to Crown land is rarely unrestricted, save in respect of certain types of land such as the law courts, and anyone seeking entry without an appointment is likely to be barred. 
 Subsections (4) and (5) disapply section 325, which contains offences that do not apply to the Crown. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of new schedule 1 insert the equivalent provisions—new sections 88C and 36C—in the listed buildings Act and the hazardous substances Act respectively.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I want to put this point on the record. I entirely accept the Minister's explanation about entry to Crown land, but I made the same point to my local planning authority when I first became a Member of Parliament in connection with a celebrated constituency case. As a matter of course, I believe that the planning authority should not go on to private land without making a proper appointment, unless it is suspected that something is going on that should not be going on. I hope that the Minister agrees. Certain provisions allow local authorities to go on to land, but I believe that to be wrong. Having made that point to my local planning authority, I am glad to say that it has not happened again.

Keith Hill: Again, I would be venturing into rather dangerous terrain if I were to offer a 100 per cent. blanket endorsement of the hon. Gentleman's argument. It seems to me that, as a general proposition, an element of courtesy and respect towards property should be displayed as extensively as possible. I am broadly sympathetic to his point.
 The hon. Gentleman asked about discussions with the Scottish Parliament and Her Majesty on the proposals for Crown and Duchy properties. Consultations, including with the appropriate Scottish authorities, have taken place. Our measures and policy intentions are the same as those of the Scottish Parliament. We are absolutely in line, and all appropriate consultations have occurred.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: To clarify, the measure is worded in such a way that it suggests that the Scottish Parliament may enact the provisions. Is the Minister confident, following those discussions, that it will enact them so that we have continuity for binding the Crown?

Keith Hill: The short answer is yes. I am confident that the Scottish Parliament will want to enact the same provisions. The hon. Gentleman was so fecund in his observations about subordinate legislation—no, it was the hon. Member for Ludlow who asked about subordinate legislation. He wanted to know whether it would be possible for Ministers to move later proposals to amend the subordinate legislation in an opposite direction to that originally intended, without primary legislation. All subordinate legislation made under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 will have to be made to apply to the Crown. New clause 16 is intended to facilitate that. The answer to the hon. Gentleman's question is no, that could not be done.
 The hon. Member for Cotswold asked about the issue of purchase notices in Scotland. Scottish 
 Ministers have to deal with dual responsibilities, as do Ministers in England. They may have to represent interests for Her Majesty's private estates. Planning decisions are subject to appeal. Scottish Ministers are the responsible authority, so their activities must be lawful and reasonable and they could be subject to judicial review. I hope that that goes some way towards assisting the hon. Gentleman. 
 I believe that I have dealt with the issue of rights of entry. The hon. Gentleman raised the matter of a drafting error in amendment No. 332. If I answer the point now, it will save any general correspondence with the Committee. Amendment No. 332 relates to amendment No. 331, which inserts subsection (2) in clause 84. I can tell the from the hon. Gentleman's body language that he might want to come back on that one, but obviously we shall be willing to respond appropriately. 
 The hon. Member for Chipping Barnet also asked about Scotland and clause 89. Amendment No. 333 would amend clause 89 on the extent to which the Bill would apply to Scotland. The matter was initially about a possible drafting error.

Sydney Chapman: I apologise to the Minister because I did not see amendments Nos. 56 and 333, which are on page 752 of the amendment paper. He has anticipated me, and I am grateful to him. My only point is that it would have been easier to include them in the group that we are now discussing, although that is not intended to be a carping criticism.

Keith Hill: I sympathise with that point.

Alan Hurst: Order. Debates between Members about where things should be listed in the schedule are not appropriate. The Minister should carry on in his normal way.

Keith Hill: Thank you, Mr. Hurst. I am happy to obey your directions.
 The hon. Member for Chipping Barnet made a further point in which he referred to the dramatic change made in the 1990 Act by the relevant measures and other provisions that have been laid on the statute book since 1990. He suggested that the Government consider bringing forward a consolidated town and country planning Act. Again, I am sympathetic to that proposal, but I just hope that I am not the Minister who has to do it. 
 The hon. Member for Isle of Wight asked what or who the Crown is. That is a rather interesting question, which I have asked myself. Paragraph 6 of proposed new schedule 1 will amend the definitions in section 293 of the principal Act. I accept that it is not easy to make sense of a jigsaw when one can see only half the pieces. However, after that amendment, section 293 will look something like new section 82C of the listed buildings Act, as set out in paragraph 7 of new schedule 1. The only substantive difference is that section 293 begins, ''In this Part''—that is, part XIII of the principal Act—whereas new section 82C begins, ''In this Act''. 
 As for the substantive changes made in the schedule, once the Crown is bound by the planning 
 Acts it becomes essential to identify all types of Crown interest. The first amendment is in paragraph 6(2)(a) of new schedule 1, which includes 
''an interest belonging to Her Majesty . . . in right of Her private estates''.
 That means that if Her Majesty wants to do some development at Sandringham, for example, she will have to obtain planning permission. We hope that we have identified the various types of Crown interest, but in case we have missed one, or some new type is created, paragraph 6(2)(c) allows the Secretary of State to make a specification by order. If I may jump forward to paragraph 6(7) of the schedule, hon. Members will be reassured that any such order will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure and will have full consideration if that situation arises. 
 All types of Crown interest must have a designated appropriate authority that can give any consents necessary and on which notices and other documents must be served. That covers precisely the hon. Gentleman's question about who the Crown is and who its representative is. Paragraph 6(3) of new schedule 1 therefore describes the appropriate authority for Her Majesty's private estates. That will be a person appointed under the royal sign manual or, in default, the Secretary of State. As a former Treasurer of Her Majesty's Household, I am of course wholly familiar with the concept of the royal sign manual. It goes without saying that— 
Mr. Turner rose—

Keith Hill: It appears that the hon. Gentleman has a question about that point. No, he does not; thank heavens for that.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: The Minister has probably used the royal sign manual to sign away many millions, if not billions, of pounds of our money. Be that as it may, is he satisfied that he knows whether any areas such as Jersey, Guernsey the Isle of Man or the Isles of Scilly might fall between all the stools in the definition?

Keith Hill: I remember the hon. Gentleman's question on that subject, and hope to deal with it when I conclude my remarks, but I now want to revert to the question of the appropriate authority for Her Majesty's private estates.
 We expect the person appointed to be an official of the royal household and we aim to include the information in guidance on the new provisions for local planning authorities. I am sure that that will be extremely helpful. Members of the Committee may like to know that there is a precedent for a person to be appointed under the royal sign manual in section 83(2)(b) of the Land Registration Act 2002, which deals with the definition of an appropriate authority. 
 Certain portions of the Palace of Westminster are owned by Her Majesty. The appropriate authorities for those portions are set out in paragraph 6(4) of new schedule 1, to which the hon. Member for Isle of Wight alluded in his intervention. 
 Paragraph 6(5) of the new schedule contains a slight variation on the definition of an appropriate authority. Members of the Committee will be aware that a person can apply for planning permission on land that he does 
 not own. If one is negotiating to buy land for development, it is prudent to obtain planning permission, if that has not already been granted, before completing the acquisition. The new subsection (2A) that paragraph 6(5) would insert into section 293 of the principal Act states that in such a situation the appropriate authority should be construed as the person making the application. In practice that means that any notices or correspondence will be for the planning consultant making the application, rather than, for example, the Department that has employed them. 
 To continue with the definition of the Crown, paragraph 6(6) of the schedule contains aids to interpretation. New subsection (3A) explains how to construe references to Her Majesty's private estates.

Andrew Turner: It is at present, of course, legal for anyone to apply for planning permission in respect of any piece of land, whether they own it or not, except presumably Crown land, where planning permission is not required. Would new subsection (2A) permit a third party to apply for planning permission in respect of Crown land?

Keith Hill: While we ponder the question, perhaps the hon. Gentleman would spell out what he has in mind when he refers to a third party. In what circumstances might what he has described occur?

Andrew Turner: The matter came to mind because of the Minister's introduction to the sub-paragraph. He referred to a potential purchaser seeking planning permission for a piece of land before purchase. The vendor of land might seek planning permission, to enhance its value, but might not want to go down that road. Is it possible for a potential purchaser of Crown land, for example, to seek planning permission for it? It appears from the Minister's remarks that the only person who would be permitted to do so would be the Crown or an agent of the Crown.

Keith Hill: I am often struck by the fact that in Committee much of our discourse is posited on the principle of ''what if?'' Indeed, much legislation is drafted on that principle. I do not for a moment allege that the present question is a case of ''whatifery'', but I imagine that if the circumstances described by the hon. Gentleman were to arise, the matter would be dealt in respect of Crown lands very much as it would be in other circumstances. However, I dare say that I shall have confirmation of that before I sit down—as members of the Committee are no doubt anxious that I should do.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I may be intervening at an illogical point in the Minister's discourse, but when he said that when Departments make planning applications they will use agents or consultants, he skated over a point. I believe that that is what he said. Is that what he envisages? If so, there will be large numbers of consultants setting up as planning agents for Departments, which is bound to increase costs. Is that what he has in mind?

Keith Hill: From a sedentary position, my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, North (Mr. Rooney)
 has suggested that that might be exactly the right niche for the hon. Member for Cotswold.
 The Government have no difficulties with the development of the service economy, although, naturally, we hope to see efficiency exercised on all occasions. I assure the hon. Gentleman that in the event of any Department employing consultants, a beady eye would be cast on the cost. That would have to be done in any circumstances. 
 I return to the subject of third parties. Before I complete my definitions—I am intent on sitting down—I will deal, as far as I may, with the question of third party applications for planning permission on Crown land. It would be possible in principle for a third party to apply for planning permission on Crown land, but I believe that the answer to the hon. Gentleman's question about proposed new subsection (2A) is that it is for the Crown to agree, and say, ''Yes, it's for a third party to apply.'' 
 We are still discussing the definition of what and who ''the Crown'' is. Proposed new subsection (3B) of section 293 of the principal Act states that for the purposes of subsection (2A), the Crown includes the Duchies and the appropriate authorities for the portions of the Palace of Westminster owned by the Crown. I may have mentioned that before. It is for the avoidance of doubt. As subsection (2A) refers to the Crown, it might be thought that that includes owners of Crown interests only, but Duchy interests are not Crown interests. We want it to mean ''owners of Crown land,'' which does include Duchy interests. As the relevant portion of section 293 is not reproduced in paragraph 6, members of the Committee might like to refer to proposed new section 82C in paragraph 7, where equivalent provisions are set out in full. 
 Paragraph 8 proposes to amend section 31 of the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990 along similar lines. It excludes the provision on interpretation of application on land not owned by the Crown, as it is unnecessary. 
 Finally, I revert to the question—posed twice, I believe, by the hon. Member for Cotswold—about the application of the proposed legislation to Jersey, Guernsey and similar islands. The answer is that the legislation would have the same scope as the 1990 Acts. That is to say that it does not apply to the Channel Islands or similar islands.

Andrew Turner: Before the Minister concludes, will he respond to my question about the possible conflict of interest where the Deputy Prime Minister, or his successor, is both guardian of the planning Acts and a holder of Crown land?

Keith Hill: That is a good question. Unfortunately, I do not have a good answer. I undertake to write to the hon. Gentleman on that issue, or will attempt to clear it up early in future Committee proceedings.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I am sorry to prolong the proceedings, but just before the Minister concludes, will he say a word about why the Crown is being excluded from tree preservation order regulations?

Keith Hill: As the hon. Gentleman knows, we will have an opportunity to debate that under a later new clause.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 6 - Crown application of planning Acts

'(1) In Part 13 of the principal Act before section 293 (preliminary definitions for Part 13) there is inserted the following section— 
 ''292A Application to the Crown 
 (1) This Act binds the Crown. 
 (2) But subsection (1) is subject to express provision made by this Part.'' 
 (2) In the listed buildings Act after section 82 there is inserted the following section— 
 ''82A Application to the Crown 
 (1) This Act (except the provisions specified in subsection (2)) binds the Crown. 
 (2) These are the provisions— 
 (a) section 9; 
 (b) section 11(6); 
 (c) section 21(7); 
 (d) section 42(1), (5) and (6); 
 (e) section 43; 
 (f) section 44A; 
 (g) section 54; 
 (h) section 55; 
 (i) section 59; 
 (j) section 88A. 
 (3) But subsection (2)(a) does not have effect to prohibit the doing of anything by or on behalf of the Crown which falls within the circumstances described in section 9(3)(a) to (d) and the doing of that thing does not contravene section 7.'' 
 (3) In the hazardous substances Act after section 30 there are inserted the following sections— 
 ''30A Application to the Crown 
 (1) This Act (except the provisions specified in subsection (2)) binds the Crown. 
 (2) The provisions are— 
 (a) section 8(6); 
 (b) section 23; 
 (c) section 26AA; 
 (d) section 36A; 
 (e) section 36B(2).'' 
 30B Crown application: transitional 
 (1) This section applies if at any time during the establishment period a hazardous substance was present on, over or under Crown land. 
 (2) The appropriate authority must make a claim in the prescribed form before the end of the transitional period. 
 (3) The claim must contain the prescribed information as to— 
 (a) the presence of the substance during the establishment period; 
 (b) how and where the substance was kept and used. 
 (4) Unless subsection (5) or (7) applies, the hazardous substances authority is deemed to have granted the hazardous substances consent claimed in pursuance of subsection (2). 
 (5) This subsection applies if the hazardous substances authority think that a claim does not comply with subsection (3). 
 (6) If subsection (5) applies, the hazardous substances authority must, before the end of the period of two weeks starting with the date they received the claim— 
 (a) notify the claimant that they think the claim is invalid; 
 (b) give their reasons. 
 (7) This subsection applies if at no time during the establishment period was the aggregate quantity of the substance equal to or greater than the controlled quantity. 
 (8) Hazardous substances consent which is deemed to be granted under this section is subject— 
 (a) to the condition that the maximum aggregate quantity of the substance that may be present for the purposes of this subsection at any one time must not exceed the established quantity; 
 (b) to such other conditions (if any) as are prescribed for the purposes of this section and are applicable in the case of the consent. 
 (9) A substance is present for the purposes of subsection (8)(a) if— 
 (a) it is on, over or under land to which the claim for consent relates, 
 (b) it is on, over or under other land which is within 500 metres of it and is controlled by the Crown, or 
 (c) it is in or on a structure controlled by the Crown any part of which is within 500 metres of it, 
 and in calculating whether the established quantity is exceeded a quantity of a substance which falls within more than one of paragraphs (a) to (c) must be counted only once. 
 (10) The establishment period is the period of 12 months ending on the day before the date of commencement of section (Crown application of planning Acts)(3) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2003. 
 (11) The transitional period is the period of six months starting on the date of commencement of that section. 
 (12) The established quantity in relation to any land is the maximum quantity which was present on, over or under the land at any one time within the establishment period.'' 
 (4) Schedule [Crown application] amends the planning Acts in relation to the application of those Acts to the Crown.'.—[Keith Hill.]
 Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 7 - Special provision for certain circumstances where disclosure of information as to national security may occur

'(1) In section 321 of the principal Act (planning inquiries to be held in public subject to certain exceptions) after subsection (4) there are inserted the following subsections— 
 ''(5) If the Secretary of State is considering giving a direction under subsection (3) the Attorney General may appoint a person to represent the interests of any person who will be prevented from hearing or inspecting any evidence at a local inquiry if the direction is given. 
 (6) A person appointed under subsection (5) must have a general qualification for the purposes of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (c.41). 
 (7) The Lord Chancellor may by rules make provision— 
 (a) as to the procedure to be followed by the Secretary of State before he gives a direction under subsection (3) in a case where a person has been appointed under subsection (5); 
 (b) as to the functions of such a person. 
 (8) Rules made under subsection (7) must be contained in a statutory instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.'' 
 (2) In Schedule 3 to the listed buildings Act (determination of certain appeals by person appointed by the Secretary of State), in paragraph 6, after subparagraph (7) there are inserted the following subparagraphs— 
 ''(7A) If the Secretary of State is considering giving a direction under subparagraph (6) the Attorney General may appoint a person to represent the interests of any person who will be prevented from hearing or inspecting any evidence at a local inquiry if the direction is given. 
 (7B) A person appointed under subparagraph (7A) must have a general qualification for the purposes of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (c.41). 
 (7C) The Lord Chancellor may by rules make provision— 
 (a) as to the procedure to be followed by the Secretary of State before he gives a direction under subparagraph (6) in a case where a person has been appointed under subparagraph (7A); 
 (b) as to the functions of such a person. 
 (7D) Rules made under subparagraph (7C) must be contained in a statutory instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.'' 
 (3) In the Schedule to the hazardous substances Act, in paragraph 6, after subparagraph (7) there are inserted the following subparagraphs— 
 ''(7A) If the Secretary of State is considering giving a direction under subparagraph (6) the Attorney General may appoint a person to represent the interests of any person who will be prevented from hearing or inspecting any evidence at a local inquiry if the direction is given. 
 (7B) A person appointed under subparagraph (7A) must have a general qualification for the purposes of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (c.41). 
 (7C) The Lord Chancellor may by rules make provision— 
 (a) as to the procedure to be followed by the Secretary of State before he gives a direction under subparagraph (6) in a case where a person has been appointed under subparagraph (7A); 
 (b) as to the functions of such a person. 
 (7D) Rules made under subparagraph (7C) must be contained in a statutory instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.''.'.—[Keith Hill.]
 Brought up, and read the First time.

Keith Hill: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Alan Hurst: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Government new clause 8—Special provision in relation to planning inquiries: Wales. 
 Government new clause 40—Special provision for certain circumstances where disclosure of information as to national security may occur: Scotland.

Keith Hill: New clauses 7 and 8 deal with the arrangements for planning inquiries when national security is at issue. I have good news for members of the Committee who are dismayed by the amount of material in the new clauses. The substance of what we shall debate is in new clause 7(1), which adds four subsections to section 321 of the principal Act—the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The remainder of new clause 7 repeats that for the listed buildings Act and the hazardous substances Act—the other two planning Acts. New clause 8 sets out how the
 arrangements will differ for inquiries in Wales. Again, that is set out three times, once for each planning Act.
 I shall describe what the new clauses do and how we expect the new arrangements to work in practice. New clause 7(1) adds subsections (5) to (8) to section 321 of the principal Act. To make sense of that, I shall start with the existing section 321. It provides that all oral evidence at planning inquiries must be heard in public and that documents must be open to public inspection. There is, however, an exception, which applies when there would be public disclosure of information relating to national security, or to the security of any premises or property, and when public disclosure would be contrary to the national interest. 
 In those circumstances, the Secretary of State may direct, under section 321(3), that specified evidence should be restricted. That provision has been in the planning legislation since 1982, but as far as we know there has never been a section 321 direction. In some ways that is unsurprising, as national security is a matter for the Crown and the Crown has not been bound by the planning Acts. Once the Crown is bound by the Acts, there will be the distinct prospect of planning applications being made that have national security implications, so we have had to devise a procedure for dealing with material that would be the subject of a section 321 direction, without violating human rights under article 6 of the convention. 
 New clause 7(1) provides the framework for such a procedure and is modelled on the special advocate procedure of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, under the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997. Subsections (5) and (6) deal with the appointment of the special advocate by the Attorney-General. Subsections (7) and (8) make provision for the Lord Chancellor to make rules, subject to the negative resolution procedure, to govern the procedure to be followed by the Secretary of State in making a section 321 direction and the functions of the special advocate. 
 I shall briefly digress to new clause 8 to describe the variations for Wales, before continuing to discuss how this will work in practice. New section 321A, which is inserted by new clause 8(1), provides that in Wales the Counsel General to the National Assembly for Wales, who is the Assembly's chief legal adviser, will appoint the special advocate. The Assembly may make regulations covering the same ground as the Lord Chancellor's rules and, if it does so, the Lord Chancellor's rules will not apply. Subsection (6) is a technical provision that prevents any regulations made by the Assembly from being subject to the negative resolution procedure in either House of Parliament. 
 I return to my main theme—how the provisions will work. The procedure is aimed at addressing two scenarios. In the first, a Crown body, such as the Ministry of Defence or one of the security and intelligence services, might need to undertake some development. That body would submit a planning application with as much information as possible, which might include most things required for a planning application to be determined, such as the location, size, bulk and external appearance of the 
 building as well as the expected traffic generation. The use of the building and what might be inside it might be omitted, because to reveal such information could compromise national security. 
 If the information provided were enough to enable the local planning authority to make a decision on the planning application, that would be all well and good. Even if the application were rejected, provided that no extra information was required a normal planning appeal could follow. The applicant Department would probably be aware from pre-application discussions of whether the local planning authority had enough information to make a decision. If the expectation was that the local planning authority would not be able to determine the application because it needed information that the applicant Department could not reveal, the applicant would ask the Secretary of State to call in the application and to make a section 321 direction for the subsequent planning inquiry. Even if the local planning authority rejected or failed to determine an application on the ground of lack of information, the section 321 procedure could be applied to a recovered appeal. 
 We envisage that the Lord Chancellor's rules will cover the procedure for showing the classified material to the special advocate and the procedure for the special advocate to make representations. If the Secretary of State is minded not to make the direction, the rules will also contain a procedure for both the applicant and the special advocate to make representations. If the Secretary of State does not make the direction, he can decide the application or return jurisdiction to the local planning authority. 
 The second scenario in which the special advocate procedure might be invoked would be one in which a private person's planning application interfered with some aspect of national security. For example, a proposed tall building might overlook a restricted site or interfere with a communications system. In that situation, the Crown would be an objector and it could ask the Secretary of State to call in the application. 
 To work properly, the system will need further secondary legislation to be made under existing powers. For example, the inquiries procedure rules will need to be amended, or separate ones made, for planning inquiries that require a special advocate. We shall also need to make provision in the Town and Country Planning (General Development Procedure) Order 1995 under section 62 of the principal Act, as substituted by clause 41 of this Bill, for the Crown to withhold such information as might be the subject of a section 321 direction. 
 Members might also wonder how we would deal with developments that are classified in their entirety, not just in detail. We propose to do that by creating a new permitted development right in the 1995 order to give legal cover for developments whose existence cannot be admitted. Almost by definition, such developments would have no planning implications. If no one knows they are there, they could hardly have a planning impact. 
 A development that might come into this category would be a house converted to an operational building 
 for the security and intelligence services. It would still appear to be a house, but the conversion would constitute a development. If the neighbours noticed some activity and approached the local planning authority, it would be for the developing Department to come up with an appropriate cover story, as it would have to do today in the non-statutory system. I hope, in the circumstances, that I have given the Committee all the information it needs.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I congratulate the Minister on introducing an exceedingly complex, although necessary, subject. Clearly, we must deal with issues of national security or the security of a building. In my former life, I was a signatory of the Official Secrets Act, so perhaps people do not even know that I exist.
 The Law Society has made representations to us on the new clause and I think that I can do the Committee a service by simply reading them out. It says: 
''New Clause 7 extends the existing exception to the requirement for planning inquiries to be held in public in relation to national security. The sub-clauses to be inserted into the Town and Country Planning Act, the Listed Buildings Act and the Hazardous Substances Act limit the persons who can represent a party, who for reasons of national security cannot themselves appear before this type of inquiry, to qualified lawyers with the right of audience in any part of the Supreme Court or all proceedings in county courts or magistrates courts.
This is unduly restrictive. Why should a competent planning consultant be excluded when the issues to be considered are related to the planning merits of an application before an inquiry even though the inquiry is not being held in public because of national security considerations?''
 On that relatively narrow point of who can represent the Government in these so-called secret applications, is the clause unduly restrictive? I have no further questions on the amendment.

Matthew Green: I would like to ask a similar question. The Law Society has done us a favour in bringing it forward. Before the Minister replies, may I give him some reassurance? New clause 7(1)(5) states:
''the Attorney General may appoint a person to represent''.
 There will always be the cover that the Attorney-General can make sure that the person who is appointed has been cleared for security purposes. That person does not have to be a lawyer. All sorts of people are cleared for security purposes, as we well know. It is beyond me why they also need to be a lawyer, particularly when we are dealing in this instance with a planning matter. 
 The Minister said that that provision was based on the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act. I can see that immigration cases require lawyers. Here, we are dealing with planning, not immigration, and I should have thought that specialist planning consultants who have been positively vetted would be just as suitable if not more so. 
 In introducing the new clause, the Minister said that new regulations would be developed to cover the situation in which the existence of buildings could not be admitted. It is not just that houses are altered for operational purposes; most Members will be aware that some buildings in our countryside do not appear on any map. Those structures have been put up 
 without any planning permission. They are not always completely unnoticeable and some are obvious from considerable distances. We are not only dealing with the internal conversion of a house for operational purposes, as there are also substantial structures, perhaps mostly underground, that do not officially exist. How will the new regulations cover those circumstances?

Andrew Turner: I start by echoing the point made by the hon. Member for Ludlow. As a child, I lived in a house that overlooked Rugby radio station, which occupied around 10 or 12 square miles in a wide valley consisting of numerous masts, eight of which I think reached 850 ft in height. However, the station did not appear on any Ordnance Survey map until I left the area, although I am not sure whether my departure from the area was associated with the station's appearance on the Ordnance Survey map. I suspect that that is exactly the kind of structure to which the hon. Gentleman was referring.
 Will the Minister give us more information on the breadth of the new clause, particularly in view of the rather tight title? I understand that the title does not form part of the legislation, but all the references made by the Minister in his introduction used the words ''national security''. Section 321(4) of the principal Act refers not only to ''national security'', but to 
''measures taken or to be taken to ensure the security of any premises or property.''
 The power of the Secretary of State, which is referred to in section 321(3), applies if making evidence 
''available for inspection would be likely to result in the disclosure of information as to any of the matters mentioned in subsection (4)'',
 and, 
''that the public disclosure of that information would be contrary to the national interest''—
 not national security but the national interest. 
 Will the Minister confirm that the application of the new clause is broader than merely—although that is perhaps the wrong word—national security? For example, does it cover the security arrangements in a prison, or the configuration of buildings within the curtilage of a prison or other premises provided for custody? It might even include arrangements for the security of other premises or property—to prevent people from getting in rather than out. 
 I am concerned that the new clause is drawn widely. It is necessary to protect part, but not all, of the information that may go before a planning committee as part of the planning application. Is it the Minister's intention that a public inquiry would be divided in two, with some parts confidential and others held in the open? What information might the person appointed by the Attorney-General be entitled to provide to objectors about the information made available in the secret part of such an inquiry? 
 Finally, it is important to return to the point made by the hon. Member for Ludlow. The public should be entitled to object to a development even if it is for national security, because there might be an equally 
 appropriate, but less obtrusive, place in which that development might take place. Even if it is possible to have divided public inquiries, few sessions should be held entirely in private. I hope that the Minister will accept that a development of 10 or 15 square miles for the purposes of an 850-ft mast cannot be kept confidential for very long. Members of the public might object to the sheer disturbance caused by such a development or to the conversion of land from greenfield to brownfield, which would be implicit in the development. They are entitled so to object and to have an inspector weigh in public whether it is the most appropriate site for such a development.

Sydney Chapman: First, may I apologise to you, Mr. Hurst? In the debate on the last group of amendments, I spoke of two subsequent amendments to be debated if there were time, and wondered whether they should have been incorporated with the ones that we were discussing. There was no implied criticism of the Chair; I would be foolish to do that. I apologise to you and to the Minister, as I referred to him too.
 I want to raise two matters. First, I take up the points made by three previous speakers about the fact that, in proposed new subsection (6) of section 321 of the principal Act, 
''A person appointed under subsection (5) must have a general qualification for the purposes of section 71 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990''.
 I have not read that, but my understanding is that the person could be somebody other than a lawyer. If it has to be a lawyer, I join my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight in putting down a marker to the effect that I protest most vehemently. I can now do that more openly than I might have done; I have resigned as a fellow of the Royal Town Planning Institute, so I cannot possibly be a planning consultant. I should have hoped that that provision included people other than those with a legal qualification, particularly because we are essentially discussing town and country planning matters. I do not want to anticipate the Minister; he could say that there are many distinguished planning consultants, some of whom have legal qualifications, so it would be a town and country planning consultant who happened, also, to be a barrister. However, the air should be cleared on the matter. 
 My second point is more nebulous, but I think that it is at the root of the issue, particularly in new clause 7. Under the Human Rights Act 1998, the Government have incorporated all the decisions and legislation of the European Court of Human Rights into our legislation. Previously, if the European Court of Human Rights made a decision, the Government, of whatever hue and whether or not they agreed with it, incorporated it into our legislation. The problem with the Human Rights Act is that our judges have to second-guess what the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights will be on any subject, even if it has not made a decision. That is getting into the barmy land of craziness, a point that I made when the Act was going through Parliament. The English or British courts have to anticipate what the European Court of Human Rights might say, and the judgment it might give. 
 Most of this clause could prove to be superfluous because it will be overridden by the European Court of Human Rights. I am not asking the Minister to make a declaration or a studied statement. The Government's legal officers may already have gone into the matter and be pretty satisfied, and positive and hopeful, about this part of the legislation. I believe that a lot is wrong with the Human Rights Act on this matter, but the European Union—God bless its soul and its ambition—is now proposing a charter of fundamental rights.

Alan Hurst: Order. The hon. Gentleman may have anticipated that he is straying wider into geographic matters, and that he ought not do so.

Sydney Chapman: I apologise, Mr. Hurst, for the second time in five minutes. It must be some sort of record. I agree with what you say, but although the Government may have a problem with the Human Rights Act, they will have additional problems if ever a charter of fundamental rights comes into being.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: I hesitate to suggest this to my hon. Friend, who has far greater knowledge than me on this matter, but I believe that a derogation from the provisions of the Human Rights Act exists on the ground of national security. I suspect that the clause may come under that derogation. My hon. Friend may have some knowledge of that; if not, the Minister will.

Sydney Chapman: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. He may be right in theory but not in practice, for the very reason raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight, which is that the judges may say, ''But there are private interests that, irrespective of it being a security matter, should rightly be expressed in public; and the third party or the person who wants to resist an application should have that right.''

Keith Hill: The hon. Members for Cotswold, for Ludlow and for Chipping Barnet raised issues relating to the qualifications of those who are allowed to act as special advocates. The broad argument was that the
 provisions are unduly restrictive. We need to be aware that we are dealing with issues of national security, and with the security of premises and property. We therefore need to exercise proper care. We want to be reasonably confident about the capacity of officers acting as special advocates to observe confidentiality on such weighty matters. It could be that not every planning officer has those qualifications. Notwithstanding the well-known libertarian instincts of the Liberal Democrat party—now, as we discover, firmly in control of its economic policy—we need to exercise a degree of caution.

Matthew Green: I agree with the exercising of a degree of caution, but the new clause states that
''the Attorney-General may appoint a person''.
 Presumably, whether or not that person has a general legal qualification, he will be positively vetted by the security services before being appointed. We need a limit on who can be proposed for such an appointment, but why rule out those with expertise on planning but include others who may not have that expertise?

Keith Hill: The hon. Gentleman makes a perfectly fair point. I note his important reference to some kind of vetting or scrutiny of the background and qualifications of the individual concerned. However, all hon. Gentlemen, including the hon. Member for Cotswold who leads for the Opposition on behalf of the Law Society, make a reasonable point. I assure the Committee that we will consider the matter.
 I turn to the point raised by the hon. Member for Ludlow about substantial new structures being carried out by an applicant authority. They will be subject to the planning procedures under a section 321 direction. 
 It being One o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Four o'clock.